ilira

Claire Sarson

Claire Sarson is in her last year of study at the University of British Columbia (UBC) majoring in Political Science and Canadian Studies. She studies Indigenous politics in Canada and international security and is currently focused on conflict and proxy warfare. She currently serves as the Editor in Chief for UBC’s Journal of Political Studies, prompting her great interest in publishing and editing, and hopes to pursue political science at the graduate level in the future.

ᐃᓕᕋ 

ilira

Land Acknowledgement 

This paper was written while on The University of British Columbia’s Point Grey Campus, which is located on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territory of the Musqueam people. The land it is situated on has always been a place of learning for the Musqueam people, who for millennia have passed on their culture, history, and traditions from one generation to the next on this site. 

Introduction 

In 2010, Minister John Duncan of Indian Affairs and Northern Development apologized on behalf of the Government of Canada for “High Arctic Relocation,” a policy of the 1950s that relocated several Inuit families from Inukjuak, Québec to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord in the High Arctic, 1200km away.[1] In an era of unprecedented and unevenly distributed wealth, coercively relocated Inuit families were excluded from active participation in Canadian socio-political society and instead were subjected to the “assertion of control over Inuit life by white institutions.”[2] The stark power imbalance maintained by colonial institutions informed the relationship between the Inuit and the non-Inuit long before their relocation. ᐃᓕᕋ or ‘ilira’ characterized the Inuit’s relationship with colonial society. The word has no direct translation, but can be explained as “a kind of fear … the feeling you have about a person whose behaviour you can neither control nor predict, but who is perhaps going to be dangerous.”[3] The Inuit-settler relationship always embodied ilira; millennia-long nomadic practices were interrupted by colonial legal and commercial interests in Inukjuak long before High Arctic Relocation took place. Thus, High Arctic Relocation must be historically examined on a spectrum of the colonial impact on Canada’s Aboriginal peoples rather than viewed as an independent event. 

This paper will utilize primary accounts from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and government officials to explore the rationale and intentions that motivated the High Arctic Relocation project.[4] Recollections of relocated individuals and families will also be examined in pursuit of a greater understanding of the lived experiences of the relocated Inuit, and how they differ from the aforementioned reports by officials. Lastly, this paper will address reconciliatory efforts on behalf of the Canadian government to the Inuit, most notably government-sponsored returns to Inukjuak in 1979, a series of reports conducted on the issue, and Minister John Duncan’s 2010 apology.  

Context: The Inuit of Inukjuak, Québec and Canada’s Interest in the High Arctic 

The Inuit of Inukjuak, Québec had, until being forcibly relocated, hunted and gathered across northern Québec for millennia. Inukjuak, then known as Port Harrison, is a small village located at the mouth of the Innuksuak River that feeds into the Hudson Bay.[5] In the early twentieth century a fur trading post was established in Inukjuak and the colonial presence (both economic and legal) further grew as police detachments, further trading posts, and schools were built in Inukjuak.[6] As the Inuit of Inukjuak had been made to shift from nomadic to sedentary ways of living, their traditional means to survival had been curbed.[7] As colonially-licensed fur traders and hunters quashed animal populations in Inukjuak, Inuit hunters were fined and imprisoned, leaving their communities without the means to continue a nomadic subsistence lifestyle.[8] Now reliant on welfare payments and commercially-available settler goods, the Inuit of Inukjuak who were relocated were promised a revitalization of their traditional ways of living and widely available game for hunting.[9] However, families were relocated to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, both islands a part of Canada’s High Arctic archipelago in close proximity to Greenland’s western coast, where the issues they faced in Inukjuak were only exacerbated.[10]

During WWII, the United States had taken on the responsibility of defending Canada’s Arctic due to their superior military capabilities and vested interest in protecting Canada (and thus themselves) from a hostile incoming attack from the north.[11] Thus, the postwar High Arctic Relocation’s timing prompted speculation that the federal government was seeking to create permanent settlements in the Arctic to reassert Canadian sovereignty. When Gordon Robertson from the Privy Council’s Office was appointed the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories in 1953, he claimed that this was not the case, arguing Canada was confident in its sovereignty and sought to behave as such by establishing RCMP outposts in Canada’s High Arctic and establishing its own law enforcement presence.[12] Following this logic, RCMP officer Bob Pilot speculated that if the RCMP outposts -- which were temporary -- demonstrated Canada’s sovereignty, so did the resettled Inuit who were “living and hunting in the area on a more permanent basis.”[13] Ben Sivertz, who served under Robertson, recalled that when the idea of relocating several families from Inukjuak to the High Arctic was proposed, RCMP Commissioner Leonard Nicholson “thought the plan fitted with the RCMP idea of curtailing the periodic incursions of Greenland Eskimos onto Ellesmere Island.”[14] Robertson did acknowledge in his own statements that he saw a few references to “Canadianizing the High Arctic as being a factor in the relocation,”[15] but that this concern was not the primary reason for the relocation.  

Even amongst officials, there was some dispute as to whether sovereignty was a primary concern motivating the relocation program. Robertson arguably had the most access to policymakers and thus the most insight on the intentions of those policymakers, considering his presence at every Cabinet meeting from 1949 to 1953.[16] He reported confidence that the government had no doubt about its title to the High Arctic.[17] Contradicting Robertson, Samwillie Elijasialak recounted that the Canadian Inuit were “told to make the Greenland Inuit feel unwelcome,”[18] though it’s unclear if this was an imperative imposed on the Canadian Inuit by the RCMP or other government officials.  

The Relocation Process 

The government officials whose recollections are documented by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in The High Arctic Relocation Volume I​ ​concur on a common narrative of the intention behind relocation: to reduce the reliance of the Inuit in Inukjuak on government-sponsored programs like welfare payments and empower them to return to their way of life before colonization. Many reported dire conditions in Inukjuak, including food scarcity and widespread poverty among the Inuit population, who, according to RCMP officer Ross Gibson “appeared to accept welfare as a way of life … they were giving up their traditional ways and becoming dependent on the white man.”[19] Sivertz also noted that the Inuit of Northern Québec were destitute due to the lack of game and fur-bearing animals.[20] Though some of the Inukjuak Inuit mentioned the scarcity of game in Québec, they rejected the claim that they had experienced extreme hunger and insisted that they had only experienced extreme hunger in the High Arctic, contradicting the reports by officials.[21] The decision to establish a relocation program was drafted and implemented in and by Ottawa with no consultation of the Inuit. Robertson suggested that the Inuit “[wouldn’t] have suggested anything different … [he didn’t] suppose that they had the capacity at that time to judge.”[22] This abnegation of consultation is​ reflective of policymakers’ treatment of Inuit communities and Indigenous communities at large; a patronizing assumption that Inuit people lack capacity for judgement and decision-making characterizes much of Canada’s legal and social treatment of Indigenous peoples throughout Canadian history. 

Following the creation of the program, RCMP officers then sought out leaders in the Inuit community to recruit other Inuit in Inukjuak.[23] The Inuit made collective decisions not through majority-rule or open-vote but by consensus agreement, and thus it was crucial for Inuit social leaders to believe the utopic panacea for the Inuit’s problems in Inukjuak that High Arctic Relocation was meant to be. In accordance with this practice, the father of John Amagoalik was approached several times in an attempt to recruit him, even after he had already refused the offer multiple times.[24] The family was told that Resolute Bay was something of a “promised land”[25] with abundant hunting, including musk-ox and caribou, resources with which to build, and support from the RCMP and government in the form of healthcare and education.[26] Concessions were promised to win over Amagoalik, including that the Inuit would be permitted to return after two years if they wished, and that they would not be separated from other families in Inukjuak.[27] The RCMP was successful at making their case, and the Amagoalik family was among those who relocated in 1953. [28] 

On the journey, the latter of the RCMP’s two promises to Amagoalik was broken and families were split into two groups: those who were to be relocated to Resolute Bay, and those who were to be relocated to Grise Fiord. Samwillie Elijasialak was told that they were only permitted to catch one caribou per year per family, and were not permitted to kill any musk-ox, despite the two animals being mentioned as part of the abundance of game in the High Arctic that the Inuit could subside on.[29] Nearly all of the relocated Inuit who participated in the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ The High Arctic Relocation ​mentioned struggling with hunger and food scarcity in both Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord at some point during their relocation, particularly in the first few years, before they had learned the most effective hunting methods.[30]  

Reports vs. Reality 

The majority of government officials reported that the relocated Inuit did not struggle with hunger or maintaining a subsistence lifestyle. RCMP Quarterly reported in December of 1953 that “all natives state being happy and content … to date no natives have requested to move back to their own countries … [they have] never been hungry or in need or want.”[31] Bob Pilot reported that “there was always plenty of game at Grise Fiord, such as seal, walrus, whale, fox, and polar bear,”[32] but relocatees reported on multiple occasions that all they had to eat was seal, and some gained such distaste for it that they ate wolves and dogs instead.[33] Additionally, relocatees reported that even decades later, they were prohibited from hunting polar bears.[34] The RCMP had overlooked the fact that due to caribou hunting restrictions, the Inuit had little access to fur-bearing animals, and thus were insufficiently clothed in seal-hide, which failed to protect them against the freezing temperatures of the High Arctic. Amagoalik remembers “scrounging for food in the [RCMP base’s] dump and for clothing and for shelter as well. Whenever an airplane arrived in Resolute, they would all go to the dump because they knew that left-over sandwiches from the flight would be thrown away in the dump. This became an important part of the food supply.”[36] In response, RCMP officer Ross Gibson began to patrol the dump, citing that there was “no reason for them to go to the dump for food. They were not starving.”[37] Gibson’s maintenance of the RCMP and government’s appearance of success further impeded the Inuit’s fight for survival in the High Arctic. Armand Brousseau and Pierre Desnoyers (both part of the Royal Canadian Airforce, stationed in Resolute Bay in 1953) observed limited game resources, noticing a few walrus and bears, but never any caribou, and confirmed that they had seen Inuit in the base dump searching for food. [38]

Brousseau and Desnoyers also reported being told that the Inuit were being sent there to “rehabilitate themselves to their original way of life and that in no way were the servicemen to associate with them or give them anything,” though the two could not comprehend the reasons for the Inuit’s isolation nor their restriction from accessing the luxuries enjoyed by the RCMP and RCAF at the base.[39] This reflected the RCMP’s judgement “that the basic needs of the Inuit were far below those of the officials” [40] in a stark demonstration of the power disparity between the Inuit and the government officials. Officials claimed the project was in pursuit of a larger welfare gain for the Inuit people, and even though conditions were imperfect, their self-sufficiency in the High Arctic would serve a greater long-term benefit for the Inuit than their government-reliance would have, had they remained in Inukjuak. However, in a project deemed an “experiment to survive”[41] by many, due to the paternalistic and supervisory character of the government officials, the experimenters attempted to abide by general tenets of objectivity, including a policy of non-interference for servicemen like Brousseau and Desnoyers. 

The role of the RCMP in this experiment was in two parts: to get the Inuit to the High Arctic, and to keep them there, the latter of which was Gibson’s specific mandate.[42] Thus, the assurances made to Amagoalik were never meant to be kept, only to be promising enough to ensure his commitment to their project. When Amagoalik requested to return to Inukjuak the spring after their arrival, his request was simply refused.[43] Samwillie’s request was similarly dismissed. He was told that the “place has to be populated” and thus that in order to return, he would have to find someone to replace him.[44] Numerous government officials report that they were never approached concerning returning to Inukjuak, with the exception of Sivertz, who did not consider individual requests as representative of the group’s interests, and since “they came as a group, the decision to return must be that of the group.”[45] However, the families from Inukjuak were splintered and located in different areas of the High Arctic, making the coordination of a large group decision (by consensus) functionally impossible. The RCMP’s claims of abundance in the High Arctic had been enough to convince the families to relocate, and the organizational structure of the relocation made it unfeasible for them to leave. Whether the intentions of the officials were benevolent and the sovereignty assertion merely incidental or sovereignty the most salient incentive and welfare of the Inuit merely a convenient excuse, “‘humane’ intentions should not be used as just cause to condone ‘inhumane’ consequences.”[46] That is to say, whatever perceived end the government had in mind does not justify the means. 

Apologies, Reconciliation, and Consequences 

More than three decades after the original relocation, in response to public pressure, the federal government funded the return of a few dozen Inuit to Inukjuak in 1989.[47] Though this relocation occurred at the will of the Inuit, it nonetheless resulted in the breakup of generational lines once again. Separation of families became characteristic of this period in Inuit life in the High Arctic; first separated from their communities in Inukjuak: from one another into Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord, from sons and daughters seeking spouses outside of the small communities,[48] from relatives ailing from TB who were hospitalized in the south for months or years,[49] and finally, in pursuit of reconciliation. Many of those who returned home to Inukjuak were those originally relocated, leaving their children and grandchildren in their own homes in Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord.[50]  

When an apology was requested of the federal government in 1990, the government commissioned the so-called “Hickling Report” (as it was carried out by the Hickling Corporation). The House of Commons standing committee on Aboriginal Affairs requested recognition of the residents of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord’s service to asserting Canadian sovereignty.[51] The Hickling Report concluded that the federal government had done little wrong beyond happenstance accidents, subsequently relieving the Government of Canada of its obligation to apologize for its alleged experimental use of the Inuit to assert its own sovereignty.[52] The following year, the Canadian Human Rights Commission contradicted the Hickling Report, insisting that there was substantial evidence that the government understood that the settlements would contribute to Canadian sovereignty. Nonetheless, the Hickling Report prevailed as the truest understanding of High Arctic Relocation, absolving much of Canada’s culpability for the Inuit’s claims of abuse and mistreatment. 

Conclusion 

The primary focus of this paper, The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ Report, concluded in 1994 that regardless of the saliency of the concern of sovereignty to the Canadian government, relocation was an inappropriate response to perceived socioeconomic problems in Inukjuak.[53] The Report recommended both compensation and apology from the Canadian government, as well as recognition of the role of the relocated Inuit families in establishing a Canadian presence in the High Arctic. In response, the federal government established a trust fund in the spirit of reconciliation, but did not apologize or recognize the importance of the relocated Inuit to Canadian sovereignty.[54] Fifteen years later, the Canadian government did apologize: MP John Duncan stated in 2010 that the Government of Canada “deeply regrets the mistakes and broken promises of this dark chapter of our history … acknowledging our shared history allows us to move forward in partnership and in a spirit of reconciliation.”[55] Despite this shift in rhetoric from one of proclaimed Canadian welfare-heroism to one of responsibility, regret and reconciliation, the federal government continues to shy away from confirming sovereignty as a material motivation in the relocation experiment. 

The stark colonial power imbalance between settlers and the Inuit before and after relocation was contingent upon the institutions of coloniality built to uphold settler superiority. The ilira experienced by the Inuit was only inflamed upon relocation to the High Arctic, where they were “so acutely dependent [on people] … who were not often disposed to listen to what Inuit wanted to do and believe,”[56] thus further sharpening the colonially imposed power disparity between the Inuit and non-Inuit. It is imprudent to imagine High Arctic Relocation as the foundation of the relationship between the Inuit and non-Inuit in Canada. Rather, the pre-existing power imbalances informed the behaviour of both groups throughout this process. Samwillie reminded the Commission that “white people were feared and their word taken as authority,”[57] as the Inuit had already survived a legacy of colonialism, and continue to do so today. 

Notes

[1] Government of Canada Apologizes for Relocation of Inuit Families to the High Arctic,​ ​ 2010.

[2] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I.​​ [Ottawa], 1994. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/aanc-inac/Z1-1991-1-41-3-1-eng.pdf.

[3]  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I​ ​, 19.

[4] Russel Lawrence Brush, “Executive Summary of High Arctic Relocation: International Norms and Standards,” Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1991. http://data2.archives.ca/rcap/pdf/rcap-11.pdf.

[5] Sociéte Makivik, “Inukjuak,” Sociéte Makivik, https://www.makivik.org/inukjuak/.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid, 143.

[8] Sarah Bonesteel, “Canada’s Relationship with Inuit: A History of Policy and Program Development,” Indigenous​         and Northern Affairs Canada​, June 2006, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100016900/1100100016908.  

[9] James, “Wrestling with the Past: Apologies,” 140.

[10] Matt James, “Wrestling with the Past: Apologies, Quasi-Apologies, and Non-Apologies in Canada,” in Age of Apology: Facing Up to the Past, ed. Mark Gibney (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 142.

[11] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I, ​ ​128.

[12] Ibid, 127, 131.

[13] Ibid, 183.

[14] Ibid, 135.

[15] Ibid, 130. 

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid, 127. 

[18] Ibid, 41.

[19] Alan Rudolph Marcus, Relocating Eden​ ​ (Hanover N.H.: Dartmouth University Press, 1995), 93. 

[20] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I, ​​135.

[21] Ibid, 31. 

[22] Ibid, 129. 

[23] Ibid, 134.

[24] Ibid, 87. 

[25] Ibid, 87.

[26] Ibid, 67.

[27] Ibid, 87.

[28] Qikiqtani Truth Commission, “Interview video: John Amagoalik” video, 1:14:33. https://www.qtcommission.ca/en/qtiq31

[29] Ibid, 39.

[30] Ibid, 186.

[31] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, ​The High Arctic Relocation Volume II.​ [Ottawa], 1994, 451. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/aanc-inac/Z1-1991-1-41-3-1-eng.pdf.

[32] Ibid, 182.

[33]  Ibid, 69, 101.

[34] Ibid, 51.

[35] Marcus, Relocating Eden​ ​, 97.

[36] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I, ​ ​88.

[37] Ibid, 178.

[38] Ibid, 197.

[39] Ibid, 197.

[40] Ibid, 23.

[41] Ibid, 86.

[42] Ibid, 174.

[43] Qikiqtani Truth Commission, “Interview video: John Amagoalik” video.​

[44] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I, ​ ​40.

[45] Ibid, 142.

[46] Shelagh D. Grant, Errors Exposed​ ​,  (Calgary: Arctic Institute of North America, 2016), 88. 

[47] Douglas Porteous, John Douglas Porteous, and Sandra Eileen Smith, The Global Destruction of Home​            ​ (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2001), 103.

[48] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume I, ​ ​53.

[49] Ibid, 98.

[50] Porteous et al., The Global Destruction of Home​ ​, 103.

[51] Frank Tester and Peter Kulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes), (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011), 

[52] Hickling Corporation, Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations Made Before the Standing​ Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Inuit Families in the 1950s​, 1990. http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/aanc-inac/R5-498-1990-eng.pdf

[53] D. Soberman, Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated​ from Inukjuak and Pont Inlet to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953 and 1955, 1991. http://www.tunngavik.com/files/2011/02/d-soberman-report-to-chrc-on-grise-fiord-resolute-bay-relocation-1991.pdf

[54] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, The High Arctic Relocation Volume II. 55 James, “Wrestling with the Past: Apologies,” 143.

[55] Government of Canada Apologizes for Relocation of Inuit Families to the High Arctic,​ ​ 2010.

[56] Ibid, 19.

[57] Ibid, 40.

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